August 28, 2026
Why was this car stopped and not the one beside it? Why did a routine traffic stop turn into a search? Was the selection of a person for investigation based on race or racial stereotypes? Questions like these, sit at the centre of some of the most consequential Charter litigation in Canada today and are regularly addressed at Fedorowicz Law, particularly in the context of vehicle stops and street checks.
Below, we break down what racial profiling actually means in law, why it’s notoriously difficult to prove, and what happens when a court finds it occurred.
The Supreme Court of Canada has set a deliberately low threshold for what counts as racial profiling. In R. v. Le, the Court held that profiling occurs where race or racial stereotypes are used, consciously or unconsciously, to any degree in the selection of a suspect or in how that individual is subsequently treated by police. Race does not need to be the dominant or even the primary reason for a stop. If race played any role at all in an officer’s reasoning, a violation of your rights under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms has occurred.
Courts have long acknowledged that racial profiling is as difficult to prove as it is objectionable. That is because police officers will rarely, if ever, admit that race factored into a decision to detain or search someone. Recognizing this reality, the law does not require direct evidence of discriminatory intent.
Instead, profiling is established through inference, drawn from the totality of the circumstances surrounding the police action. Where the circumstances of a stop are consistent with profiling, a court is entitled to infer that racial stereotypes factored into the decision to single out a particular individual.
No. This is one of the most misunderstood aspects of the law. The inquiry into racial profiling does not turn on whether an officer, viewed generally, holds conscious or unconscious racist attitudes. Even an officer who is genuinely and self-consciously fair-minded, can have their reasoning shaped by unconscious bias as to why someone was selected for investigation in a particular moment.
The relevant question is narrower than a character assessment: courts must scrutinize the specific internal reasoning process that led to the specific police action under review, not the officer’s character as a whole.
Perhaps the most significant practical consequence of this framework is that having a legitimate reason for a stop does not fix, or cure, an illegitimate one. To be clear: a policing decision influenced even in part by race or racial stereotypes is unlawful. It cannot be salvaged by the fact that reasonable grounds may have otherwise existed. If improper reasoning about race or racial stereotypes factors into suspect selection or treatment, the reasonableness of the decision is defeated outright, regardless of what other, legitimate grounds the officer may also have had.
For example, if a vehicle rolls through a stop sign, but the court finds that the decision to stop it was based, even in part, on the race of the driver (for instance, there was evidence that multiple other vehicles ran the same stop sign without any police response) a Charter breach will be found.
Where a court finds that a detention, search, or arrest was tainted by racial profiling, the resulting breach is typically treated as serious for the purposes of the section 24(2) Charter analysis. As result, evidence seized by the police— a weapon, drugs, or other physical evidence — will inevitably be excluded. This result reflects the view that allowing the justice system to rely on evidence obtained through profiling would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice, particularly among the communities most affected by this conduct.
If something about a stop, a search, or an arrest didn’t sit right, that instinct is worth taking seriously. Warning signs can include:
None of these facts alone proves racial profiling. Together, however, they can support the kind of inference the law allows a court to draw. Racial profiling is not a marginal or theoretical issue in Canadian criminal law — it is a live and frequently litigated question, supported by a well-developed body of Supreme Court and Ontario Court of Appeal authority.
If you believe a police interaction may have been influenced by racial profiling, contact Fedorowicz Law to discuss the specifics of your matter. Cases often turn on details buried in disclosure, that don’t look significant on their own, but tell a very different story once put together